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ABSTRACT 
Malawi is one of the few African countries that has 
experienced neither a military coup nor a civil war, and 
has remained peaceful since independence despite being 
under a dictatorial regime for three decades. Its military 
has earned international recognition for being 
professional; however, the country faces significant 
institutional challenges to democratic civil-military 
relations, where there is legislative oversight, and checks 
and balances between the executive and legislature. 
This thesis identifies and analyzes civil-military 
relations challenges currently facing Malawi, and suggests 
solutions that can contribute to healthy civil-military 
relations. Specifically, it focuses on the civilian control 
of the armed forces and the relationship between the 
president and the legislature in military oversight. The 
power relations between these two arms of government, as 
provided in the republican constitution, is described and 
assessed as a contributing factor to various challenges in 
democratic civil-military relations. I argue that the 
presidential powers remain the dominating factor in the 
country’s civil-military relations and goes unchecked 
despite embracing democratic principles. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The main theme of civil-military relations is 
politics, and as Malawi is still in the transitioning 
period from an authoritarian regime to democracy, there is 
a great need for democratic consolidation in civil-military 
relations. One of the most vital areas for democratic 
consolidation is the democratic civilian control of the 
military, and it is the responsibility of both the 
executive and the legislature. In this thesis there will be 
a heavy emphasis on issues of control and oversight, since 
without oversight there is no control.1 Good civil-military 
relations are, therefore, a process whereby democratically 
elected civilian leaders have control over all the policy 
decisions of the military and there is a balance of power 
coupled with checks and balances between the executive and 
the legislature in the management/employment of the armed 
forces. Legislative oversight is vital to ensure that the 
executive does not abuse its powers in the employment of 
the armed forces, and at the same time, ensure that the 
military is performing as intended. This legislative 
function, therefore, requires that members of parliament 
are well informed on military issues and oversight, a task 
that is more challenging in most developing countries, 
including Malawi. 
 
                     
1 Class notes in civil-military relations coursework at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, January 2007. 
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A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze 
civil-military relation problems currently facing Malawi, 
and suggest solutions that can contribute to healthy/good 
civil-military relations. Specifically, it will build upon 
Bruneau’s observation that civil-military relations are not 
only about the civilians and the military, but also between 
the civilians themselves in their management of the armed 
forces2 and assessing power relations between the 
legislature and the executive, and the consequences of the 
management of the military. 
The literature on the specific case of Malawi is very 
limited. However, it has been noted that the Malawian 
military has been both a positive agent for social 
transformation and an instrument of conquest, humiliation 
and repression at different times in the country’s history.3 
The use of the armed forces in internal security has been 
recurrent in Malawi since the colonial period. Mandiza 
notes that during the (colonial) federation period, the 
armed forces, then known as the Kings African Rifles (KAR), 
were used to repress the nationalist movement.4 During the 
one-party authoritarian rule between 1964 and 1994, the 
armed forces were used in a similar way by the political 
                     
2 Thomas Bruneau, “Introduction,” in Who Guards the Guardians and 
How, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, Austin, TX: Texas 
University Press, 2006, 2-3. 
3 E.I. Mandiza, “Civil-Military Relations in Malawi: A Historical 
Perspective,” in Ourselves to Know: Civil-military Relations and 
Defense transformation in Southern Africa, edited by Rocky Williams, G. 
Cawthra and D. Abrahams, Institute for Security Studies 2002, 113-120. 
4 Mandiza, 115. Kings African Rifles arrested the leadership of the 
nationalist movement in Malawi and over 51 Malawians were killed. This 
exercise highlighted the dangers of using armed troops in internal 
security roles. 
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elite to repress political dissent.5 Since the attainment of 
the multiparty democracy in 1994, the armed forces have 
continued to be involved in non-military operations and 
there have been isolated incidents of strained civil-
military relations.6 At the same time, the military was 
instrumental in the transition to democracy and has shown 
an interest in limiting itself to its constitutionally 
stipulated roles and missions. The armed forces, for 
instance, managed to effectively disarm a paramilitary wing7 
created during the authoritarian one-party rule, in the 
most professional manner. Soldiers stayed in the barracks 
and maintained high levels of discipline even when there 
have been calls from the general public for the military to 
take over the government due to poor governing by the 
political leaders.8 Given the professionalism of Malawi’s 
armed forces, which have always been apolitical, why have 
civil-military relations not developed further? How can we 
explain this paradox? 
                     
5 Mandiza, 124-127. 
6 Mark D. Chiziko, “Civil-Military Relations or Civil-Military 
frictions? Problems and Prospects of Civil-Military Relations in Malawi 
and SADC Region,” Unpublished Paper presented at the SADC military 
seminar in Salima, Malawi, May 2006. 
7 During the one party authoritarian rule, the President Dr Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda created a paramilitary wing called Malawi Young Pioneer(s) 
which was used as a Presidential guard and was ideally meant to 
countercheck the regular armed forces. It was brutal in its operations 
but with the dawn to democracy in 1993, the Malawi Defense Force 
managed to disarm it efficiently. 
8 BBC News, “Malawi's Media Urges Restraint,” May 24, 2004. Malawian 
independent Capital Radio reported that the police shut down a private 
radio station, MIJ 90.3, and arrested four journalists - including its 
station manager Evans Masamba - for interviewing an opposition 
spokesman who threatened to call on the army to "take over" if 
Mutharika was declared president. However, an army spokesman, Clement 
Namangale, was quoted as saying the military "would always remain 
neutral and not interfere in the electoral process," 
www.bbc.co.uk/africa/html (accessed November 2007). 
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This thesis argues that Malawi is facing serious 
institutional challenges to viable civil-military 
relations, despite its history of stable civilian control 
of the armed forces, and that these challenges are rooted 
in relations among civilians charged with managing the 
armed forces. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Malawi is one of the few countries in Africa that has 
never experienced a military coup or a civil war. However, 
as pointed out by Samuel Finer, the absence of a coup does 
not necessarily indicate good civil-military relations.9 
Indeed, Malawi’s model of civil-military relations is built 
upon inefficient and ineffective institutions that need to 
be reformed if they are to further viable democratic civil-
military relations. There is very little research on 
Malawi’s civil-military relations, and this research will 
contribute to the systematic study of civil-military 
relations in Malawi. The transition to democracy in Malawi 
has brought with it different challenges to the management 
of the armed forces in the country. It has rendered 
strategies used to control the military insufficient and 
ineffective. The military is an important institution for 
both stability and consolidation for democracy in the 
country. Hence, putting reforming institutions that mediate 
the relationship between the armed forces and the 
democratically elected civilians will not only encourage 
democracy, but also ensure stability in the country. 
                     
9 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military 
in Politics, New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2002. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Civil-military relations have drawn major 
contributions in social science. The relationship between 
the armed forces and the society involves an inherent 
struggle for power.10 Peter Feaver argues that “the very 
institution created to protect the polity is given 
sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.”11 
Military coups have been a traditional worry for the civil-
military relations theory. Similarly, the question of 
obedience by the armed forces to their civilian leaders, 
without pursuing their own interests has been the greatest 
challenge of leadership in most countries.12 Feaver and 
others point out that ultimately only the military’s 
“voluntary and purposeful adherence to the principle of 
civilian control ensures civilian control.”13 Morris 
Janowitz notes, similarly, that officers are “subject to 
civilian control, not only because of the rule of law and 
tradition, but also because of self imposed professional 
standards.”14 Bland, in agreement with others, points out 
that there are enough instances in western history in which 
officers have not volunteered to adhere to the principle,  
 
                     
10 Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Political Science Annual 
Review 2, 1 (1999): 214. 
11 Peter Feaver. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military 
Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 27, 4 (Summer 2001): 528. See also 
Peter Feaver. Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear 
Weapons in the United States, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, 
253. 
14 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political 
Portrait, New York: The Free Press, 1960, 420. 
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or have done so grudgingly, to raise a question as to 
whether a principle of civilian control is merely a 
platitude.15 
Civil-military relations have operated differently in 
both single-party authoritarian rule and democracies. In 
African literature there is a general consensus that the 
leaders in the continent devised similar strategies for 
ruling their countries and maintaining civilian control 
over their armed forces. Samuel Decalo argues that African 
leaders in “assumed stable countries” (those that did not 
experience military coups) adopted five basic strategies in 
the 1980s16 to subordinate the military to civilian 
authority. First, they employed preferential recruitment 
into the armed forces (especially its officers’ corps or 
specialized units) of members of ethnic, religious and 
                     
15 Bland, “History is replete of examples of stress, strain and 
occasional raptures in civil-military relations in western democracies. 
Consider for example, the ‘Curragh incident’ in the United Kingdom in 
1914; the army rebellions in France between 1958- 1962; General 
MacArthur’s challenge to President Truman; the so called ‘crisis in 
civil-military relations’ in the United States at the beginning of the 
Clinton era when the president apparently acquiesced to some 
significant military policy preferences; and the misconduct in the 
Canadian Armed Forces during and after units deployed in Somalia in 
1993. All of these events save perhaps the French rebellions, occurred 
without a direct assault on the concept of civil control of the 
military, but they were all resolved only after subtle applications of 
the idea by the players involved.” 
16 Samuel Decalo, “Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 27, 4 (1989): These countries 
include Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, Cameroon, Senegal, Gabon, 
Kenya, Mauritius, The Gambia and Tanzania. 
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regional groups considered to be supportive of the regime.17 
Second, they created elite units often called presidential 
guards, in order to monitor any plotting and provide a 
totally loyal counterweight against a possible assault from 
the regular army, air force or even the police.18 Third, 
they appointed members of the head of state’s direct family 
to key posts of command in the senior officer corps, 
intelligence, republican guard, police and paramilitary 
structures.19 Fourth, these internal strategies were then 
reinforced by guarantees of external military assistance in 
case of domestic upheaval or a politically motivated 
invasion, especially in the former French colonies. France 
had been the sole power with a priori military commitments, 
and a credible in situ deterrent military presence in West 
Africa, thus contributing to the stable civil-military 
                     
17 Decalo, 561. This, in essence, was a continuation of similar 
patterns of the colonial recruitment, though the targeting group may 
have changed, but such policies were systematically pursued by many 
regimes in Africa and elsewhere, civilian as well as military, often 
leading to ‘ethnic armies.’ For instance, when Kenyatta moved to 
presidency, he inherited an army of the Kamba majority and his ethnic 
group, Kikuyu, was too small to overtake the Kamba and others who were 
already established in the army. However, strongly infusing the 
officers’ corps and staffing key control units with the Kikuyu was 
certainly feasible and this was well exploited by Kenyatta through a 
highly mobile, well trained, heavily armed elite General Service Unit 
(GSU- a political force, the regime’s coercive arm against its internal 
enemies). 
18 These include the presidential guards, GSU, paramilitary 
structures, intelligence-gathering units, informal networks of 
political spies, etc. This trend has always backfired since they have 
frequently triggered internal military jealousies and have become the 
prime motive for a coup as in the case of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and 
Modibo Keita of Mali just to mention a few. However, the GSU of Kenya 
saved what could have been the first coup in the country in 1982 when 
the air force attempted to stage a coup. 
19 This strategy allows the president to keep his fingers on the 
purse of the armed forces as well as his hands on their operational 
control. Ian Khama’s entry and progressive promotion to ultimate 
command of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) is a case in point. In 
Gabon in the 1980s, many relatives of the president were in command in 
the army, police and intelligence.  
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relations.20 Finally, the loyalty of armed forces has been 
bought by providing officers and soldiers with salaries 
that are either relatively or absolutely high as well as 
other material and fringe benefits. N’Diaye’s more detailed 
case studies also support Decalo’s arguments.21  
There is a general consensus in the literature that 
these strategies of achieving civilian control of the armed 
forces, originally employed by single-party authoritarian 
regimes, are inadequate in new democratic regimes. It is a 
fundamental premise of democratic civil-military relations 
that civilian control of the armed forces is possible 
without democracy, but democracy is not possible without 
civilian control of the armed forces.22 N’Diaye, following 
Samuel Huntington, argues that a state is more likely to 
achieve lasting institutionalized civilian control when 
civil-military relations are based on the 
professionalization of the military.23 But this in turn 
requires shaping a policy that restrains the politicization 
of the military and meddling in its internal affairs.24 
Herbert Howe notes that “military professionalism benefits 
                     
20 Decalo. This external prop contributed to less internal military 
conspiracies since its gains would be axiomatically reversed by 
superior external forces. One Gabonese military officer rhetorically 
complained that ‘what is the point of speculating about change in 
Libreville if the very next day the RIAOM (French Military) will be 
landing at Mba airport?’ There was a widespread awareness in all 
quarters, civil and military, that Paris will not allow the fall of the 
civilian regimes in Abidjan, Dakar, Libreville, Yaoundé and a few 
others, including strategically important Djibouti. 
21 Boubacar N’Diaye, “How not to Institutionalise Civilian Control: 
Kenya’s Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997,” Armed Forces and 
Society 28, 4 (Summer 2002): 619-640. 
22 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal 




from accountable and institutionalized governments that 
agree not to cross the civil-military divide but whose 
oversight may often benefit the armed forces operational 
effectiveness.”25 
Thus there is a general consensus among current 
scholars in civil-military relations that military 
professionalism must be supplemented by the 
institutionalization of civil-military relations if a 
balance between democratic civilian control of the military 
and effectiveness of the armed forces is to be achieved and 
maintained.26  
Bruneau and Tollefson provide a general framework for 
the analysis of the institutionalization of civil-military 
relations in democratic regimes.27 Bruneau argues that the 
issue of civil-military relations in both old and new 
democracies involves ongoing conflict, negotiation, and 
compromise between those who hold power by free and fair 
elections and the organizations to which society has 
granted a monopoly on the means to violence.28 In order to 
strike a balance in the ongoing negotiations and compromise 
in a democracy, institutions are created. Institutions 
affect behavior of the key actors in a political society 
and are a major component of politics. The rational choice, 
institutionalism, emphasizes that political action involves 
the management of uncertainty and that the free flow of 
                     
25 Herbert Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, 275. 
26 Bruneau.  
27 Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, editors, Who Guards the 
Guardians and How, Austin, TX: Texas University Press, 2006. 
28 Bruneau, 3. 
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information is very important for the smooth management of 
power relations and stable political outcomes.29 Hence, the 
more effectively institutions in civil-military relations 
allow for the flow of information and the smooth management 
of uncertainty, the more stable and effective civil- 
military relations will be. The relevant institutions 
include the ministry of defense, the legislature, civil 
society and the intelligence system.  
Bruneau and Goetze suggest that the existence of a 
ministry of defense (MOD) is an important basic indicator 
of the quality of the civil-military relations in any 
country.30 It serves to institutionalize civilian control of 
the military by structuring the power relations between 
democratically elected civilian leaders and the armed 
forces command. Civilians are empowered to formulate policy 
on defense-related issues and the military has to implement 
those policies effectively by using its expertise in their 
monopoly on the use of violence. Related to this, the MOD, 
ideally, plays an important part in defining and allocating 
responsibilities between the civilians and the military. 
This can help to prevent the military from being directly 
involved in politics and allow the selected civilian 
leaders to represent and negotiate for military needs, for 
instance, in the legislature. This arrangement enhances 
democracy and potentially removes the likelihood of 
introducing the military, which has a monopoly on violence 
                     
29 Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the 
Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies XLIV (1996), 951. 
30 Bruneau and Goetze, 71. Some of these ministries are hardly more 
than facades, with no power whatsoever; however, an effective MOD is a 
core element in contemporary democratic civil-military relations. 
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and the potential to blackmail, into the political system.31 
Bruneau and Goetze further argue that the MOD plays a role 
toward maximizing effectiveness in the employment of the 
armed forces. The changes in the security environment 
demand immediate changes in the roles and missions of the 
armed forces and the capacity to implement such missions by 
the military. However, the military bureaucracies are 
usually among the slowest to change due to huge investments 
and lead time needed; therefore, it is the MOD that assists 
in achieving wide-ranging and extremely dynamic military 
and political coordination. Hence, the MOD enables the 
military to adjust immediately to security needs and 
develop the capacity to achieve them. And again, the MOD 
ensures the maximization of the efficient use of resources 
as the roles and missions change. These resources are, for 
instance, funds, personnel, and equipment. Efficiency, in 
this instance, means the ability to achieve a goal at the 
lowest possible cost. The civilians within the MOD can 
implement programs for ensuring budget transparency in the 
military, act as arbiters, minimize duplication among 
services, and sell off unnecessary facilities. Finally, the 
MOD has the responsibility of initiating and developing the 
white papers on defense in new democracies, which will act 
as a guideline in defining the roles and missions of the 
armed forces in the changing environment.32 
                     
31 Bruneau and Goetze. If the armed forces are left to their own 
devices, which is most often the situation in authoritarian regimes, 
they work out deals and understandings among themselves whereby they 
inflate their requirements to maximize the benefits of all services. 
And, as new democracies seek to bring their armed forces under control 
and to cut costs, an effective MOD appears to be the most appropriate 
institution for these purposes. 
32 Bruneau and Goetze, 71-98. 
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The legislature is another institution that can play 
an important role in sustaining good civil-military 
relations. Jeanne Giraldo argues that legislative debates 
on defense issues can help contribute to the increased flow 
of information, thereby creating an informed public that 
will be able to participate constructively in future policy 
discussions. This can help expose any abuse of power by the 
military as well as achieve a democratic civilian control 
of the military. At the same time, these debates will 
provide insights on how the military is carrying out its 
missions, that is, if the military is efficient and 
effective in its operations.33 The legislative powers to 
make and oversee budgets, decisions, laws and policies and 
their implementation allow it to amend legislation and 
adjust the budget. The power of the purse provides 
civilians with the key lever of control over the military 
and ensures its effectiveness and efficiency.34 She further 
argues that the legislature also has power in the 
deployment of troops at home and abroad, procurement, 
promotions of officers, as well as the legislative right to 
approve or reject contracts. Congressional hearings on the 
military provide the legislature with the necessary means 
of getting the feedback on the way resources have been used 
by the military and can be an effective means of evaluating 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces. 
However, in most cases, the legislature in both old and new 
                     
33 Jeanne Giraldo, “Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and 
Effective Governance,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How edited by 
Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, Austin, Texas University Press, 
2006, 189-191.  
34 Ibid. The current debates over the Iraq war budget and the 
continuation of war is a good example of this, although the debate is 
between congress and the executive. 
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democracies fails to perform such functions, mostly due to 
time limits for the budgets, access of information and the 
ability and willingness of legislators to influence the 
defense budget.35 Giraldo argues that “in most countries 
budget debates are charged affairs carried out under great 
time pressure and with the knowledge that the budget must 
be passed before the current one runs out, or else.”36 Given 
this limited time for scrutiny, executive budget requests 
are merely rubber stamped. She further argues that a 
meaningful congressional input into the budget process 
depends on whether the legislators have sufficient 
information about the contents of the budget and the policy 
implications of the fiscal decisions. While this is a 
general problem in most countries, it is a major problem in 
most African countries due to both lack of specialized 
knowledge and expertise. This lack of knowledge has 
negatively affected how African legislatures have 
implemented their defense budget cuts without undermining 
national security and have provoked intense frustration in 
the armed forces. 
Similar to the legislature is the role of an informed 
civil society. Civil society plays a vital element in the 
civil-military relations and this is very evident in the 
American civil society, especially with the continuation of 
war in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners of war. An 
informed civil society works as a watch dog on any abuse of 
the military and other arms of government, and thus 
performs the checks and balances of the government as a 
                     
35 Giraldo, 189-192. 
36 Ibid. 
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whole.37 However, there is also a wide gap of knowledge in 
the civil society on defense issues. In most African 
countries there is no incentive to accommodate the civil 
society in defense-related policies, hence civil society 
has no interest in getting involved in the security sector 
and has contributed very little to national security. 
Another institution vital in civil-military relations 
is the intelligence system. What makes it difficult to come 
under democratic civilian control and assess its 
effectiveness and efficiency is the secretive nature of it. 
Democracy, however, requires accountability of all the 
actors in it as well as transparency. In trying to bring it 
under democratic civilian control, Bruneau and Dombroski 
suggest that democracies must establish a clear and 
comprehensive legal framework for intelligence activities 
just like in the armed forces. However, they are quick to 
point out that a legal mandate alone is not enough and that 
other measures must also be put in place, such as a clear 
determination of the intelligence functions to be 
implemented and how much of the country’s resources will be 
allocated to them. In this way, it will be easier for the 
civilian leadership to take stock and assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence system and 
hold them accountable for any misdirection of resources. 
They also suggest that the common mechanism for controlling 
intelligence is to separate it into different agencies and 
                     
37 Laurie Nathan, “Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New 
Democracies,” Journal of Security Sector Management 2, 3 (September 
2004).This article was commissioned by the Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management as part of the Berghof Handbook 
Dialogue Series No. 2 on Security Sector Reform, 
www.berghofcenter.org.html (accessed June 2007). 
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prevent any single entity having a monopoly on its 
production and use.38 This remains the greatest challenge to 
most African states. Kenneth Dombroski argues that a 
practical problem for most emerging democracies involves 
the organizational dynamics of transforming its 
bureaucracy.39 The most immediate impact of the 
transformation process is the organizational efficiency 
decline, and this has been an argument against intelligence 
reform in most countries, since it implies subjecting the 
nation to both internal and external threats.40 Overcoming 
such resistance to change requires strong political will as 
well as the necessary expertise in designing the 
transformation process and the training of personnel in the 
intelligence system. 
The armed forces throughout the history of Malawi have 
been more accountable to the executive, especially to the 
president, and not to parliament or civil society. This 
institutional imbalance has survived democratization, and 
continues to undermine viable civil-military relations. The 
question that will be addressed in this thesis is why the 
Malawi armed forces are still very subject to control by 
the executive branch of government and not to parliament or 
the civil society, despite the assumed balance of power put 
                     
38 Thomas Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: 
The Challenge of Control in New Democracies,” in Who Guards the 
Guardians and How, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, 
Austin, TX: Texas University Press, 2006, 145-176. 
39 Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: South Africa after 
Apartheid,” Journal of Democracy 17, 3 (July 2006): 54.  
40 Ibid. 
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forward in the constitution and Defense Force act.41 In 
other words, why are there unbalanced power relations 
between the executive and the legislature in the management 
of the armed forces, and how has this affected the military 
and civil-military relations in Malawi?  
I will argue that Malawi has very weak institutions to 
create workable and effective civil-military relations, and 
that there is no balance of power between the executive and 
the legislature in the management of the armed forces. The 
concluding part of the thesis will be prescriptive, 
attempting to suggest how institutions can be reformed to 
improve civil-military relations. Unless the institutional 
capacity is well structured and developed, Malawi’s civil-
military relations will remain loosely defined, ineffective 
and vulnerable to any slight disturbance in the political 
system. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
A single case study process tracing method will be 
used to investigate this question. After demonstrating the 
imbalance in the executive and legislature authority, the 
thesis will trace the specific effects of this imbalance on 
civil-military relations. The thesis will be based on 
information obtained from books, journals, articles and 
documents from the Ministry of Defense and Malawi Defense 
Force, especially from the Defense Force Act and the 
Constitution of Malawi. Phone interviews with senior 
                     
41 The Malawian constitution provides for the establishment of a 
Defense and Security Committee of the national assembly to ensure bi-
partisan oversight of the Defense Force and to reinforce the role of 
parliament for legislative and legal actions in relation to the 
military. 
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officers in the Defense Force and legislature will also be 
used along with my personal experience and observations 
during my work in the Defense Force. 
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN MALAWI SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
This chapter is primarily concerned with analyzing how 
civilian control and civil-military relations in Malawi 
have been pursued since independence. Malawi is one of the 
few African countries where a military coup has not taken 
place and the military has remained under civilian control 
since independence. This chapter examines the policies 
adopted by the three post-independence heads of state for 
the management of the armed forces, showing how legislative 
powers have been neutralized, and creating executive 
dominance in the system. I will argue that the seeds of 
this executive dominance over the legislature were planted 
during the creation of the colonial period, and nurtured by 
policies adopted by post-colonial Malawian leaders. As a 
result, legislative oversight has not produced a system 
that ensures the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the 
armed forces. At the same time, the system has negatively 
affected military funding and operations after the 
transition to democracy, due to inadequate legislative 
influence. However, the military has done better than one 
could expect in maintaining its professionalism, despite 
persistent interference from the president for decades. 
But, the civil-military relations system will not become 
effective and efficient automatically with greater 
legislative power as recent events demonstrate. There is a 
need to institutionalize the oversight of the military in 
order to insulate the military from any political influence 
and enhance military professionalism. Hence, this chapter  
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will support the thesis argument that Malawi has a weak 
institutional framework for viable civil-military 
relations, despite the absence of a coup. 
A. BRIEF RELEVANT BACKGROUND OF MALAWI 
On July 6, 1964, Nyasaland became an independent 
state. The country was renamed Malawi and the first 
battalion of the British colonial Kings African Rifles 
became the Malawi Army. British colonial authorities had 
used the military to suppress insurrections by the locals 
and to appropriate land from the native population.42 At 
independence, the armed forces were comprised of white 
officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and 
indigenous soldiers. Two years into the post-colonial era, 
the British governor was still the commander in chief of 
the armed forces, which created political challenges in the 
management of the armed forces in a newly independent 
Malawi.43 
Soon after independence, the new Malawian leader, Dr. 
Kamuzu Banda, faced opposition from his cabinet due to the 
slow rate of Africanization and the low salaries of African 
civil servants in comparison to their white colleagues.44 In 
order to counter this opposition, Banda dismissed several 
cabinet ministers. The white offices in the Malawi Army and 
                     
42 B.H. Kinsey, “Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence 
from Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Program,” Journal of Southern African 
Studies 25(2) 1999. See also K. Elford, “Land reform: Whites biased,” 
Global Analysis, September 19, 2007 
www.glob.co.zw/homepage/land_reform.html (accessed May 2007). See also 
Poverty Reduction Forum. “Harare at a sanctions regime that exacerbates 
the economic problems for the general citizens,” Annual Report: 
Promoting Change through Dialogue, 2000. 
43 Mandiza, 118. 
44 Ibid. 
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the Malawi Police only observed this political event as 
they were under the governor general as commander-in-chief 
who kept the military non-involvement policy in politics. 
Sensing growing political opposition, Banda reinstated the 
colonial powers of preventive detention in 1964.45 Banda 
upheld four party cornerstones (values) upon which his 
party and government were built, namely obedience, loyalty, 
discipline and unity. He later used these cornerstones to 
effect an oppressive regime.46 
The independence constitution stipulated the existence 
of a parliament, an executive authority headed by the prime 
minister, and an army. One of the military missions was to 
“defend Malawi and to be used in the maintenance of law and 
order” within the country under the direct control of the 
president.47 This was a continuation of the same mission as 
the colonial forces. The 1966 constitution stipulated that 
the president would be commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces with powers to appoint the army commander. 
Parliament was given a regulatory role.48 However, as it 
shall be shown later in this chapter, this regulatory role 
was not realized. On attestation, officers took an oath of 
allegiance to the established political leadership as a way 
of fostering civil-military relations. Section 82 of the 
Army Regulations (Regular Force) (Officers) forbade 
officers from committing acts that might constitute active 
                     
45 Rev Ross article published in The Magazine, Malawi, 1977, in 
Mandiza, 118. 
46 Any slight disagreement with Banda’s policies was defined as 
something against the four cornerstones and many people lost their 
lives in prisons while serving their sentences. 
47 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, (1966).  
48 Ibid. 
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participation in politics and from displaying symbols of 
political significance.49 This legislation, coupled with 
systematic recruitment and high quality training, insulated 
the military from political participation and produced a 
professionalized force despite persistent political 
interference from the executive branch. Since its 
inception, the Malawi Defense Force adopted a quota 
recruitment system from each district and this has helped 
produce harmonious armed forces in the country.  
B. CIVILIAN CONTROL STRATEGIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS UNDER BANDA (1964-1993)  
Like most African states, Malawi became a de facto 
single party state soon after independence. A few years 
later, Banda succeeded in making it a de jure single-party 
state and later made himself a life president of the 
country through legislation that was rubber stamped by 
parliament.50 The deployment of the armed forces in internal 
operations, permitted under the Malawi constitution, was 
quite extensive in the first few years of the Banda regime 
but later decreased as the country was effectively brought 
under his authoritarian rule.51 Unlike most African leaders, 
Banda did not openly pursue the civilian control strategies 
                     
49 Malawi Defense Force Act, Section 82 of the Army Regulations 
(Regular Force) (Officers), (2004), 70-71. 
50 Harold Nelson, Margarita Dobert, Gordon C. McDonald, James Mc 
Laughlin, Barbara Marvin and Donald P. Whitaker, Area Handbook for 
Malawi, American University, Washington, DC, 1975, 172-3. See also 
Wiseman Chirwa, Nandini Patel and Fidelis Kanyonolo, Democracy Report 
for Malawi. http://www.idea.int/publictions/sod (accessed June 2007).  
51 In November 1964, the military was deployed together with the 
police to restore law and order in Mangochi as there had reportedly 
been acts of arson, damage of property, intimidation and hooliganism. 
In September 1967, the military was deployed to counter a criminal 
gang, which was effectively engaged and disbanded. From then onwards, 
the army was extensively used in ceremonial parades. 
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of the armed forces by using ethnicity or close family 
relations in military leadership.52 This protected his 
leadership from possible military and public criticism in 
the early period of his rule. With this, he also avoided 
ethnic antagonisms and cleavages in the military 
establishment that led to political instability, and in 
turn coups, as happened in other African countries.53 
However, he managed to put up several mechanisms and 
institutions as military control strategies. These 
strategies included direct personal control of the military 
by maintaining long tenure of office for the armed forces 
top commanders and special benefits for other military 
officers.54 In addition, the second strategy was the 
formation of Malawi Young Pioneers (which was Banda’s party 
militia and later acted as a presidential guard).  
The first strategy put in place by Banda in the 
control of the armed forces was maintaining the defense 
force commander for a long period. He maintained two 
defense force commanders from the departure of white 
officers in 1972 until towards the end of his regime in 
                     
52 Banda appointed the first Defense Force commander who came from 
the southern region of the country and of a different ethnic group 
while he came from the central region. Although the second commander he 
appointed eight years later came from the central region, he was not 
from his ethnic group and there was no relationship at all. He had very 
few senior military officers from his ethnic group (The Chewas) 
although it is one of the major ethnic groups in Malawi. See also 
Decalo, 547-578. 
53 Boubacar N’Diaye, The challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian 
Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast, and Kenya in Comparative Perspective, 
Maryland, Lexington Books, 2001: 38-47.  
54 Mandiza. Some senior officers in the military were given sums of 
money as a way of rewarding merit and further argue that this was also 
a means of buying their loyalty. Another method that was put in place 
to buy loyalty, was that officers, on attainment of certain ranks, were 
given loans to acquire land for agriculture. 
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1992.55 Through this he established patron-client networks 
that reached down into the military by granting favors to 
the Defense Force generals. He promoted the first Malawian 
defense force commander from the rank of lieutenant colonel 
to brigadier and appointed him the force commander on the 
same day. Less than two weeks later, he promoted the force 
commander again to major general after the military’s 
successful operation taking over a hijacked South African 
Airways flight that had been diverted to Blantyre from 
Zimbabwe.56 Such promotions were frequent, and ostensibly 
designed to further the Africanization of the Defense 
Force. However, they also served to curry favor with the 
military and made it insensitive to his authoritarian rule. 
Similarly, senior officers were given money ostensibly to 
reward merit, but also as a means of buying loyalty. On 
attainment of certain ranks, officers were given loans to 
acquire land for agriculture. The military pay structure 
was also de-linked from the rest of the civil service and 
adjusted upwards. This was done on the basis that military 
service was an extreme expression of patriotism.57  
The second strategy was the armament of Malawi Young 
Pioneers. The MYP, originally formed to provide vocational 
training to Malawian youth, became politicized and was used 
as an auxiliary organ of Banda’s presidency, answering to 
the president alone. Its main purpose was changed to 
ensuring that everyone conformed to the Malawi Congress 
                     
55 General Matewere was appointed Defense Force commander from 1972 
to 1980, and then General Khanga took over from him up until 1992. 
General Yohane briefly served as the commander before the transition to 
democracy when Banda’s political influence decreased. 
56 Malawi Times Newspaper, May 29, 1972, cited in Mandiza, 120. 
57 Mandiza, 120. 
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party policy, and in doing so, it became increasingly 
secretive and militarized.58 The MYP’s centrality was 
reflected in its rapid expansion. For instance, in 1968, an 
MYP patrol boat was put into service on Lake Malawi, at a 
time when the national Defense Force had no naval craft.59 
In 1970, the president purchased the first aircraft for the 
MYP and three pilots of the MYP were awarded their wings, 
at a time when the standing Defense Force had no aircraft.60 
In the context of a single-party state, and with the 
defense force still headed by white officers who would be 
leaving the country in few years, there was no political or 
military opposition to such steps. Upon completion of their 
study programs, some graduates from the Pioneer bases 
returned to the movement, but others were employed in 
public and private institutions with the purpose of forming 
an intelligence network across Malawian society.61 MYP 
graduates infiltrated every major government institution. 
Pioneers were also deployed to guard government buildings, 
and in the process, were encroaching upon police functions. 
Every secondary school had an MYP teacher who was 
responsible for discipline and physical education and was 
the most feared teacher at every institution. In short, 
Banda successfully turned the MYP into his intelligence 
organization and an effective counter force to the regular 
Defense Force of the time.  
                     
58 Mandiza, 121. 
59 The Times Newspaper, September 19, 1968, cited in Mandiza, 122. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Reuben Chirambo, “Operation Bwezani”: The Army, Political Change, 
and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in Malawi, Nordic Journal of African Studies 
13, 2 (2004): 146–163. 
 26
The appointment of the first indigenous commander of 
Malawi defense force did not change the nature of civil-
military relations in Malawi; the MYP continued to enjoy 
the prestigious assignments as the developers of the 
fledging military air unit.62 Between 1971 and 1974 nine 
pilots of the MYP were trained and these were the only 
pilots in the Malawi security forces.63 Banda maintained 
personal control of the military.64  
In 1973, President Banda dismissed from cabinet and 
party Aleke Banda, a man believed to have been the brains 
behind the MYP and a notable young leader who significantly 
supported Banda during independence struggles, and also 
several political leaders with direct ties to the MYP.65 
This was followed by the MYP’s loss of its marine unit to 
the army and the helicopter section in 1978 and some MYP 
officers were transferred to the army to maintain the 
vessels.66 Hence, the improved status of the military during 
this period was not connected to the appointment of the 
indigenous commander, but rather points to the 
unquestionable powers that Banda had accumulated, by this 
time, through his dictatorial rule, and that he could 
                     
62 Harold Nelson, Margarita Dobert, Gordon C. McDonald, James 
McLaughlin, Barbara Marvin and Donald P. Whitaker, Area Handbook for 
Malawi, American University, Washington, DC, 1975, 311. 
63 Ibid., 311. 
64 Ibid., 303. 
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Malawi: African Historical Dictionaries, The Scarecrow Press, Lanham, 
Maryland, London, 2001, 21. See also Nelson et al., 173. In 1972, Banda 
made six cabinet reshuffles and demonstrated his ability to expel 
anyone he felt necessary from government and party posts. Aleke Banda 
was dismissed because in the interview with foreign newsmen he agreed 
that he could be considered President Banda’s most likely successor. 
66 Mandiza, 123. 
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regulate anything without any resistance from the military 
or from any government institution. This is also evident by 
the fact that from the early 1980s, the MYP regained its 
lost status with new leaders in place and became an 
effective counterweight to the military and police again.67 
It formed the major part of the presidential guard, and 
some weapons meant for the armed forces were diverted to 
their bases by the government.68  
It is worth noting that MYP and Malawi army resentment 
was a long standing issue in Malawian politics both 
internal and external. With the civil war in neighboring 
Mozambique from 1975 to 1992, there is evidence that Dr. 
Banda played double standards in the conflict.69 Initially, 
he supported the Mozambican rebel group, Renamo, in 
collaboration with the Portuguese colonial rulers before 
the Mozambican independence and continued to support it 
after independence by providing MYP personnel to fight 
against the government troops of Frelimo. Later, after 
accusations from the Mozambican government and different 
African leaders, Banda sent the Malawi Army into Mozambique 
to work with government troops in fighting against the 
                     
67 Kings Phiri, “A case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary 
Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young 
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rebel group Renamo, and at the same time, protecting 
Malawi’s railway for the transportation of imports and 
exports. Hence, Banda successfully placed the Malawi Army 
and Young Pioneers in opposing missions in Mozambique from 
1987 to 1992.70 This case is significant in the civil-
military relations in Malawi because similar cases 
contributed to military coups in other countries. For 
instance, in Portugal, junior officers staged a military 
coup in 1974 because, among other reasons, they were tired 
of numerous deployments in Portuguese African colonies to 
fight against the indigenes that were fighting for 
independence, an operation that incurred many casualties in 
the Portuguese camp.71 Although Malawi Defense Force 
soldiers expressed anger at the Mozambique scenario, 
pressing their general to confront Banda and his henchmen, 
who were believed to control the Young Pioneers in the late 
1980s, there is no indication that the army general ever 
confronted Banda.72 This was obviously because Banda’s 
hegemony undermined the army’s potential for resistance and 
possible coup attempts in Malawi.73 
However, MYP lost its relevance in the early 1990s and 
became less effective due to Banda’s old age and 
international donor community pressure for democratic 
change in Malawi and most African countries. The Catholic 
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bishops, in 1992, issued a pastoral letter critical of 
government and this was followed by university students’ 
and urban workers’ demonstrations and strikes, sparking off 
popular protest against the regime.74 The growing domestic 
pressure for political change demanded the abolition of 
Banda’s oppressive apparatus including the MYP. This made 
the weakened MYP become more hostile to the army, as the 
army supported the political transition process and the MYP 
sought to maintain the status quo.75 On December 1, 1993, 
Pioneers deliberately shot and killed two soldiers in Mzuzu 
after a disagreement at a local drinking place. 76 Following 
the incident, a senior MYP official told the BBC that the 
MYP were preparing to deal with any reaction from the Army, 
and with these remarks and the long-standing tensions 
between them, the MYP and MDF erupted into open conflict. 
On December 3, the MDF attacked MYP headquarters and the 
ruling party headquarters adjacent to it.77 This was an act 
of rebellion, but it was complicated by the fact that the 
National Consultative Council, the only credible political 
body at the time, had called for the dissolution of the 
MYP.78 Banda, who was also commander in chief of both the 
army and the MYP, diffused the situation by announcing on 
state radio that the disarmament of the MYP that the NCC 
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had called for, was underway, and by urging the MYP not to 
resist.79 This was to preserve his credibility, suggesting 
that the army was acting on his orders when things were out 
of control for him. 
It is, however, interesting to note that during the 
disarmament of the MYP, the army was in complete control of 
the country due to the incapacitation of Banda, and that 
the disarmament orders, issued by the three-man 
presidential commission appointed by Banda to rule the 
country on his behalf, were largely ignored by the soldiers 
and came too late into the disarmament operation.80 Sensing 
their failure to control the military, the presidential 
commission immediately handed over leadership to Banda, who 
had not yet fully recovered from brain surgery. The defense 
force, however, maintained its professionalism by only 
concentrating on the MYP bases amidst general fears from 
the ruling party camp that it would also attack politicians 
who were behind the MYP power. Hence, Operation Bwezani 
marked “a significant phase in the development of the 
Malawi Defense Force in civil-military relations.”81 The 
culture of political non-involvement of the military has 
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been enhanced by the armed forces itself through its 
internal checks and legal framework. The defense force has 
been quick to inquire and punish any active political 
participation by its soldiers. For instance, a soldier was 
dismissed from the service for wearing a political party 
shirt from one of the pressure groups that was fighting for 
democratic transition, although the military supported the 
political transition within the same period. 
In conclusion, Banda pursued different civilian 
control mechanisms of the military under single-party 
authoritarian rule. One of his major strategies was the 
establishment of the MYP, which he used as his intelligence 
organization and equipped as a stand-by force to counter 
the armed forces. The legislature could not perform any 
oversight function of the military as it was directly under 
Banda’s rule. During the political transition, the Malawi 
Defense Force played a crucial role in disarming the MYP 
with professionalism and this event marked a significant 
step toward viable civil-military relations. The military 
support for political transition can also be attributed to 
the tensions that existed with the MYP. It is worth noting 
that Operation Bwezani was started by the junior officers 
and soldiers, not by the top commanders who had political 
connections with Banda’s regime. Soon after this 
disarmament, the Ministry of Defense was established to 
ensure effective communication between the military and the 
civil authorities. The first minister of defense was 
appointed in 1964. However, this was a symbolic position, 
since a structure of the Ministry of Defense was not yet 
developed and the minister had little influence over the 
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management of the defense force.82 The overall effectiveness 
of this Ministry of Defense will be assessed later in the 
thesis.  
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER BAKILI MULUZI 1994-2004 
Muluzi emerged as a winner during the first democratic 
elections in 1994 and became the second head of state in 
Malawi after three decades of authoritarian rule. This 
political change demanded subsequent changes in the 
institutional structure of the country. All government 
institutions, including parliament, became more open to 
public scrutiny. Free media came with investigative 
journalism and became the primary source of information for 
the general public. However, there was little progress in 
institutionalizing civil-military relations.  
Muluzi’s party, the United Democratic Front, won a 
significant number of seats in the 1994 parliamentary 
elections, but it could not make up the two thirds majority 
required by law to pass bills and budgets. Then Muluzi 
worked out a political maneuver and formed a coalition with 
the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) party in order to have 
an overwhelming majority in parliament. He thus replicated 
Banda’s control of both the executive and the legislature; 
hence there was no power to check the executive powers over 
the military. Although the 1994 constitution provides for a 
Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly, 
the committee did not perform its functions as stipulated 
by the law. As a result, the Muluzi government weakened the  
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newly established institutional structure in civil-military 
relations and denied any learning opportunity for the 
parliamentarians of a newly democratized Malawi. 
Muluzi’s style of leadership and military control 
strategies were not a significant departure from those of 
Banda. However, within a period of four years from 1994 to 
1998, Muluzi changed the defense force commander five times 
(though one died in office) before he got the right one who 
remained in office until Muluzi handed over the presidency 
to his successor in 2004. The frequent changes of defense 
chief was a clear departure from Banda, but once the right 
man was in office, Muluzi returned to Banda’s practice of 
establishing personal links with the military commanders 
and controlling the military through patron-client networks 
rather than through legislative or Ministry of Defense 
oversight. This personal link is quite evident by the fact 
that soon after leaving office, the defense force commander 
joined the Muluzi party and has since been active in the 
party.83  
The most significant event in civil-military relations 
in Malawi during the Muluzi era took place in 1995. The 
defense force commander was reported killed by suspected 
car thieves; however, this was linked to an alleged coup 
plot by Lt. Colonel Njoloma who immediately went into 
hiding after the news of the general’s death.84 Five 
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soldiers were arrested in connection with the plot and 
Njoloma eventually handed himself over to the military. All 
were court martialed and convicted, and Njoloma died in 
prison. The fact that Malawi has had a coup plot indicates 
that the system, like in most African countries, is still 
vulnerable to coup attempts. This event points to the need 
to have institutionalized civil-military relations that 
will work toward preventing such occurrences. However, it 
is worth pointing out that institutionalization alone does 
not prevent coups, but it does work toward providing a 
professional military. Lack of legislative oversight is 
also demonstrated in the intelligence apparatus in Malawi.  
Muluzi established a National Intelligence Bureau 
through an act of parliament during his first term of 
office. This was, ostensibly, to provide the intelligence 
requirements of the country. However, it was used largely 
as a party intelligence agency to spy on political 
opponents of his party and senior military officers. In 
other words, it became a replacement for the MYP of the UDF 
government.85 This intelligence organization was also under 
the direct control of the executive and the legislature’s 
job was to just pass its budget without any oversight. 
Another factor contributing to continued weak 
institutionalization of civil-military relations in the 
democratic period is that in Malawian society and politics, 
the military is seen as a different entity of government 
                     
85 Asia Africa News, “Malawi president dissolves national spy 
agency,” Asia Africa Intelligence Wire Publication, January 5, 2005, 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com (accessed December 2007). See also 
“Shyley to head new Intelligence body in Malawi,” http://allafrica.com 
(accessed January 2008). See also Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily 
Newswire. 
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and there is not much activity in the armed forces to 
expose it to public scrutiny as is the case in the United 
States. As a result, the military is not often put in the 
spotlight or even discussed in parliament or the media. 
In conclusion, the Muluzi term of office did not see 
the civil-military relations structure evolve toward that 
expected in a democracy. The 1994 constitution did not 
alter the executive powers over the management of the armed 
forces and gives little power to the legislature. The 
legislature has no oversight of the military; the power 
remains in the executive, and largely to the president 
himself. The president has the power to appoint and fire 
the defense force commanders without parliamentary approval 
and is not obliged to give reasons for firing the 
commanders.86 Little progress was made in the Muluzi era to 
institutionalize the civilian control of the armed forces, 
and this has worked to the disadvantage of the military in 
a democracy. This period saw a significant reduction in 
military funding, the establishment of the Ministry of 
Defense and the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and 
Security made no impact on negotiating for better funding 
of the military.87 The parliamentary oversight was largely 
ignored though it had been vaguely provided for in the 
                     
86 BBC News, “Malawi's president sacks security chiefs,” January 17, 
1998, www.bbc.co.uk/africa/html (accessed November 2007). 
87 Institute for Security Studies, “Malawi Fact File,” ISS 
Publication, Pretoria, South Africa, 2001, 9. The Defense Force budget 
had been cut systematically since democratic transition. The Armed 
Forces failed to conduct recruitment and training for soldiers and 
officers despite the need to do so and when the training was done, it 
was with significantly little funding for an effective and required 
training standards. This was a significant departure from the training 
funding in the Banda era, and the institutions required to press for 
military funding in a democracy failed to do so.  
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constitution. This was due to two reasons: Muluzi’s control 
of the legislature that made any checks and balances in the 
military oversight difficult, and lack of expertise in 
oversight by the parliamentarians. In this regard, there 
was no distinction with the Banda regime; the only 
difference was that this operated in a multiparty 
democracy.  
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER BINGU WA MUTHALIKA 
Muthalika took over power as a head of state during 
the general elections in June 2004, having been hand picked 
by Muluzi to succeed him.88 However, it was soon clear that 
Muthalika did not intend to be the puppet for Muluzi that 
many, including Muluzi, expected. Six months after being 
elected on the UDF ticket, Muthalika left the UDF and 
formed his own party, amidst public tensions with Muluzi, 
who was then UDF party chairman. The UDF had performed 
poorly in the 2004 general elections and most seats went to 
opposition parties and independent candidates. This was 
largely the result of an economic downturn and rampant 
corruption, which was attributed to the UDF government. In 
addition, some opposition parties protested against the 
presidential election results, claiming that they were 
rigged by the ruling party. This meant that Muthalika faced 
greater opposition in parliament than Muluzi had, both from 
within his own party and from opposition parties. After 
abandoning the UDF, he set about rebuilding a parliamentary 
majority around his established party. Some members of 
parliament left their own parties to join the president’s 
                     
88 BBC News, “Malawi’s President Rules ‘his way,’” September 1, 2004, 
www.bbc.co.uk/africa/html (accessed December 2007). 
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party. Tense legal battles against these members ensued and 
the Supreme Court eventually ruled that the members of 
parliament had crossed the floor in parliament and it was 
up to the Speaker of the National Assembly to declare their 
seats vacant, or not, and call for fresh elections. This 
episode constituted an intense power struggle between the 
executive and the legislature. How has this legislative 
muscle flexing affected legislative oversight of the 
military or transparency in government dealings with the 
armed forces, if at all? How has it affected the military? 
These are the questions that will be answered in this 
section. 
The first thing that the Muthalika government did 
after the eruption of political tensions in 2005 was to 
abolish the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) since it was 
viewed as a pro-UDF organization. The organization still 
worked for Muluzi and was thus a source of tension between 
Muluzi and Muthalika. Several UDF officials were implicated 
in the alleged plot to assassinate the president in 2005, 
where NIB was alleged to be at the center of the plot.89 The 
country operated without the intelligence agency for a 
while, and it was later restructured. However, its 
operations remain unclear and subject to political 
manipulation as there is no legislative oversight.90  
                     
89 “Malawi president dissolves national spy agency,” Asia Africa 
Intelligence Wire Publication, January 5, 2005, 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com (accessed December 2007). See also 
“Shyley to head new Intelligence body in Malawi,” http://allafrica.com 




The military has been on alert to respond to internal 
security problems arising from political tensions among the 
elites throughout the Muthalika era. At times, it has 
performed police functions (mounting road blocks to prevent 
an opposition political rally), something that sparked a 
political controversy as to the role of the military in the 
country and its status of being apolitical.91 However, this 
action was justified by the fact that a court injunction 
obtained by the opposition party (UDF) restricted any 
police action in the matter and the armed forces were the 
only solution, in that case, to serve the national security 
interests. In other words, the military has always 
displayed its allegiance to support the government of the 
day and impartiality in domestic politics. The civilian 
control and military willingness to obey civilian 
authorities have been evident in the Muthalika era despite 
political tensions in the country. However, without an 
appropriate framework for managing civilian control, and 
with its broad constitutional role, the military easily 
becomes a tool of the president despite its best 
intentions. Soon after the 2004 presidential election 
results were announced, most opposition leaders made 
various radio announcements calling for the military to 
take over the government, but the armed forces remained 
                     
91 Nation Newspaper, March 26, 2007. The News editorial centered on 
the March 25, 2007 abortive political rally in Mulanje by the 
opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) following intervention by the 
Malawi Defense Force (MDF) personnel who had mounted road blocks in 
several strategic places. It was that intervention that had prompted 
others like the Malawi Commission for Human Rights (MHRC) to 
unreservedly condemn the action by the army. However, this was done to 
avoid any political crashes between the president’s supporters and UDF 
supporters since the President was also addressing a political rally 
within the same location.  
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neutral and stayed in the barracks.92 This gesture by the  
military has shown continued military professionalism and 
respect for civil authorities, although there is no 
institutionalized oversight. 
Although the legislature has been dominated by 
opposition parties during the Muthalika era, there has been 
no significant legislative oversight of the armed forces. 
The executive has always found its way out and makes all 
decisions on the employment of the armed forces without 
legislative approval. The work of the Defense and Security 
Committee of the National Assembly has yet to be seen. The 
other big challenge of the legislative oversight is that 
the incumbent president has, in most cases, also been the 
minister of defense. This has made the Ministry of Defense 
unaccountable to the legislature, since the president 
cannot be summoned to answer any questions from members of 
parliament. Hence, executive powers in the oversight of the 
armed forces have always been dominant and the opposition 
parties, though they are the majority in parliament, have 
not influenced executive decision-making in regard to the 
employment and oversight of the armed forces. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter III when the issue of power 
relations between the executive and the legislature will be 
assessed. 
In conclusion, the transition period from 
authoritarian rule to democracy has demonstrated a 
significant need to institutionalize civil-military 
                     
92 MIJ 90.3 FM radio station, was shut down on May 23, 2004, 
following an interview it broadcasted with the opposition Mgwirizano 
Coalition's spokesperson, Kholiwe Mkandawire, in which she threatened 
to sabotage newly-elected President Bingu Mutharika's inauguration. 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/media/22792 (accessed June 2007).  
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relations for the military to be significantly separated 
from political influence. The period between 1994 and 2004 
saw military benefits that Banda had put in place, being 
removed without explanation. The defense budget had been 
cut systematically since the democratic transition. In 
2000, it stood at US$26 million and declined further to 
US$19 million in 2001.93 The Ministry of Defense and the 
Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, 
institutions responsible for negotiating for better funding 
of the military in a democracy, failed to do so, 
demonstrating weak institutional capacity in civil-military 
relations in the country. This has not insulated the 
military from political initiatives since the top 
commanders have to seek better funding for their 
institution, subjecting the whole military set-up to be 
vulnerable to political manipulation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The historical analysis of civil-military relations in 
Malawi shows extreme power imbalances between the executive 
and the legislature in oversight of the military. The main 
reason for this has been the colonial legacy, which left 
more power in the hands of the executive than the 
legislature in the constitution. Malawian leaders later 
maintained a status quo that served their interests and 
added political manipulation to the institutional imbalance 
established by the colonial administration. The legislature 
never pressed for its share of military oversight, even 
after the democratic transition of 1994. Similarly, there 
                     
93 Institute for Security Studies, “Malawi Fact File,” ISS 
Publication, Pretoria, South Africa, 2001, 9. 
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have been no policy initiatives to institutionalize the 
civilian oversight of the armed forces from either branch 
of government. The Malawi Defense Force has voluntarily and  
purposely adhered to the principle of civilian control, in 
the absence of any significant institutions, in ensuring 
civilian oversight.  
The Malawi Defense Force has only been deployed for 
hostilities after independence in Mozambique, from 1987 to 
1992. However, its operational information is still 
classified and nothing has been done to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the operation, or a list of 
lessons learned from the operation. The defense force, 
however, has been deployed in numerous United Nations and 
African Union peacekeeping operations and in disaster areas 
such as Mozambique and Malawi, and has maintained good 
discipline and professional standards. The Malawi Defense 
Force is rated as one of the best professional militaries 
in Southern Africa.94 With this background, most political 
leaders have not attempted to institutionalize the civilian 
oversight of the military and have not developed the 
expertise to do so. Military professionalism alone, 
however, does not indicate stable civil-military relations. 
Hence, the overall assessment of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the legislature has largely been ignored in 
the process. Every president has devised his own control 
strategies for the military and has managed to acquire an 
assurance that the military will not topple his government. 
In the process, the military is not fully insulated from 
political manipulation, especially since the MOD and 
                     
94 Kings Phiri, 1. 
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National Assembly Committee on Defense and Security have 
done little to secure enough funding for the military. This 
shows the biggest gap between the current literature in 
civil-military relations and what is being practiced in 
Malawi. The next chapter will assess and analyze the power 
relations among the executive, the legislature and the 
military, as provided in the constitution and the Defense 
Force Act, in order to establish ways for democratic 
consolidation and objective civilian control of the 
military. It will also assess how civil-military relations 
actors in Malawi have performed. This will help to 
establish the argument further for lack of expertise and a 
weak institutional set-up in civil-military relations. 
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III. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN MALAWI 
The history of Malawian civil-military relations 
indicates that “civilian supremacy” is well established, 
and that democratically elected government has unquestioned 
authority over all policy issues, including those relating 
to the armed forces themselves. However, there is little 
institutionalized civilian oversight of the military and 
there is unquestioned executive dominance in the control of 
the armed forces, which creates an institutional imbalance 
that weakens democratic civilian control of the military. 
The previous chapter demonstrated the continued personal 
dominance of the president in control of the military in 
the democratic era. This chapter will focus on the 
legislature and the Ministry of Defense, showing how these 
two institutions have failed to embrace the powers accorded 
to them by the new democratic constitution, leaving the 
control of the military in the hands of the president and 
undermining the democratization of civil-military relations 
in the country. Finally, a brief assessment of civil 
society will be done indicating how it has been ineffective 
in promoting civil-military relations due to lack of 
political awareness.  
A. THE LEGISLATURE 
This section will focus on the constitutional 
weaknesses in providing a viable civil-military relations 
framework and then the focus will shift to the legislative 
failure in implementing military oversight. The 1995 
constitution provides for legislative oversight of the 
 44
military, but with unbalanced powers between the executive 
and the legislature. The constitution gives the executive 
branch much more influence and control over the military 
than the legislature. It provides that “the ultimate 
responsibility of the defense forces of Malawi shall vest 
in the president as commander in chief.”95 It further states 
that any power conferred on the president, by the 
constitution, shall only be exercised on the 
recommendations of the Defense Force Council, which shall 
include the minister of defense, secretary to the office of 
the president and cabinet and the high command of the 
defense force.96 This legislation is, however, misleading 
since it gives the impression that the president cannot act 
without the recommendations of the defense council, which 
is not how it has been interpreted by anyone in government. 
The president has, in several cases, employed the armed 
forces without the recommendations of the council.97 In 
addition, the Malawi Defense Force will form part of the 
African Union Multinational Standby Force in the near 
future, and has already participated in joint training with 
other Southern African states in preparation for this 
standby force. None of these issues have been discussed in 
                     
95 The Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995: 71. 
96 The latter is essentially the defense force commander and the 
chief of staff, since the Malawi defense force is mainly dominated by 
the army with a much smaller marine unit and air wing, so there are no 
service chiefs to be included in the high command. 
97 The Nation News Paper, “Time to Review Strategy, Mr. President,” 
November 24, 2006. “…Unlike the United States President, George W Bush, 
Muthalika just like Bakili Muluzi before him doesn’t have the courtesy 
to justify to the electorate how he exercises his power…” 
http://www.nationmw.net (accessed November 2007). See also BBC News 
“Malawi’s President Sacks Security Chief,” January 17, 1998. 
www.bbc.co.uk/news (accessed August 2007). 
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the National Assembly.98 Similarly, Malawi’s ongoing 
participation in the African Union and United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations continues to be decided by the 
executive without any input or deliberation in the National 
Assembly.99 
The Defense Force Act also gives the president 
responsibility for promotions and appointments of the 
military top command, including the commander/chief of the 
Malawi Defense Force, and fires them without giving any 
reason and without any involvement of the Legislative 
Committee on Defense and Security.100 Similarly, the 
constitution does not require the president to seek consent 
from the National Assembly when troops have already been 
deployed in the case of imminent threat; hence, these 
constitutional provisions do not provide the checks and 
balances that have proven essential to viable democratic 
civil-military relations elsewhere. 
The current political environment further undermines 
the National Assembly’s role on the budget process in 
general, and legislative oversight of the armed forces in 
particular. For the past three years, Malawi has 
experienced more political contention in national budget 
sessions in parliament than at any time in the country’s 
                     
98 Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly source, 
which has opted to be anonymous for this research.  
99 Ibid. The national assembly does not deliberate about peacekeeping 
operations, i.e., make choices whether Malawi should participate. 
Everything is under the directives of the executive. 
100 BBC News “Malawi’s President Sacks Security Chief,” January 17, 
1998, www.bbc.co.uk/news (accessed August 2007). This has been the case 
since Malawi got its independence and has been the practice of all 
heads of state in Malawi. It is not only the case in Malawi, but also 
in Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe and many other countries in Africa, which 
were under British colonial rule. 
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history.101 This has resulted in the loss of public 
confidence in parliamentary deliberations since the 
opposition has used the budget sessions to get even with 
the government, and in the process, they have put their 
political aspirations above national societal interests. 
The budget session in parliament, which normally takes 
about two months, took over four months in 2007/2008 
because opposition members refused to discuss the budget 
before the question of expelling pro-government members of 
parliament, who had switched political parties from the 
opposition to the government side was addressed. This stand 
by the opposition members of parliament was widely 
condemned by civil society and led to massive 
demonstrations by university students and concerned 
citizens.102 Only when the president threatened to close 
parliament if the opposition members of parliament 
maintained their stand, was the budget discussed and 
finalized within a month and without significant alteration 
of the budget proposed by the president.103 This indicates 
an institutional shortfall in the proper functioning of the 
legislature in a democracy and the significant powers of 
                     
101 Bingu wa Muthalika, “An address to the Nation,” Presidential 
address made on July 20, 2006, 1-8. See also Daily Times Newspaper, 
December 14, 2007, Phillip Bwanali, former Minister of Youth, Sports 
and Culture in the UDF administration, was arrested on December 12 for 
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103 The Daily Times Newspaper, “Parliament Passes the Budget,” 
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the president, even in a situation where there is huge 
opposition in parliament, and the same powers have been 
evident in the management of the armed forces throughout 
the democratic era.104  
The Malawian legislature also fails to put its 
oversight authority into practice once the budget has been 
passed, especially with respect to the armed forces’ 
budget. With the cash budget implementation in Malawi, 
which basically means that the country spends the amount of 
money collected in the previous month, there are 
significant fluctuations in the monthly allocation of 
finances to the military, with allocations sometimes only 
covering salaries.105 Hence, what is provided in the 
national budget for the defense force is not what is 
actually spent. Since the transition to multiparty 
democracy in 1994, the Malawi Defense Force has experienced 
more financial problems, which have compromised military 
training and readiness. Military underfunding and failure 
to see that budgeted resources are indeed delivered to the 
armed forces, tends to add to doubts among military 
officers that the civilians responsible for oversight 
understand military needs for maintaining readiness and 
operational capability. Without such civilian expertise and 
provisions, the confidence needed to undergird civil-
                     
104 BBC News, “Muluzi and judiciary clash over third term,” June 4, 
2004, www.bbc.co.uk/africa/html (accessed January 2008). Former 
President Muluzi was quoted as saying that he will instruct both the 
army and police that demonstrations should not take place against his 
third term bid, when a High Court Judge ruled that the president's 
decree was illegal," indicating that he had the full control of the 
armed forces and no other arm of government could stop him in the 
employment of the security force. The Malawi constitution provides for 
only two consecutive terms for the President.  
105 Personal experience. 
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military relations, supportive of democracy, can easily 
erode. The importance and complexity of the military’s core 
mission in the modern world demand close collaboration 
between military officers and civilians who understand the 
military’s needs, and it is under such circumstances that 
civilian authorities can exercise proper oversight of 
military activities.106 Congressional hearings on the 
military provide the legislature with the necessary means 
to get feedback on the way actual resources have been used 
by the military, and are effective means of evaluating the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces.107 
Building up sufficient civilian expertise with the 
legislature generally, and especially the legislative 
defense committee, is a long term process and can only be 
done in collaboration with the executive. Since the 
National Assembly, as a whole, cannot be directly 
responsible for military affairs, the Malawian constitution 
provides for a Defense and Security Committee of the 
National Assembly. 
B. DEFENSE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY  
The composition of this committee is proportional to 
the political parties represented in the National Assembly. 
With the current political composition in parliament, this 
committee is dominated by the opposition parties, however, 
like the legislature, the contributions of the Defense and 
                     
106 Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, “Introduction,” in Civil-
Military Relations and Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc 
Plattner, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, 
xvi. 
107 Giraldo, 178-207. 
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Security Committee in establishing democratic civil-
military relations has been limited by its constitutional 
mandate, and failure to implement the powers that are 
accorded to it constitutionally. The constitution provides 
for a Defense and Security Committee of the National 
Assembly, but limits the tenure of its members to just one 
year.108 This short tenure, especially considering the 
limited expertise regarding defense issues for most members 
of parliament, is a fundamental obstacle to committee 
members developing the expertise they need to carry out the 
functions of the committee effectively. This 
constitutional/legislative gap could be bridged by a 
professional committee staff with sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of the military’s institutional requirements, 
which would act as an institutional memory for the rotating 
MPs. Unfortunately, the current parliamentary staff members 
in the Defense and Security Committee have no professional 
knowledge of national defense issues or military oversight, 
and the majority of the staff is involved in clerical 
duties.109 This combination of inexperienced MPs and 
parliamentary staff with little or no expertise in defense 
and security has led to weak legislative oversight of the 
military.110 The armed forces, though submissive to civil 
                     
108 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1995, Section 162(2). 
71. 
109 Personal communications with inside sources on the Parliamentary 
staff. Most workers in the parliamentary staff are involved in 
logistical and secretarial jobs rather than working as expert advisors 
to different committees in the National Assembly. 
110 Personal experience, the defense and security committee has never 
raised any issues of military inappropriate employment or issues of 
peacekeeping operations even when these issues are discussed in the 
media, and there no committee reports have been published, since it was 
established, that provide for legislative issues of the military. 
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authorities, need to be confident that expanding 
legislative authority will not compromise the nation’s 
security or institutional prestige and integrity.111 Under 
the prevailing circumstances in Malawi, there is nothing to 
support such confidence.  
Other than approving the military budget, which is 
passed without significant changes, rarely does a 
substantial discussion of military matters take place in 
legislative deliberations. In addition, the legislature 
does not follow through the military budgets to ensure that 
the military is funded as approved in the actual budget, 
and this puts the military at a disadvantage. Although the 
constitution gives more power to the executive in the 
control of the military, it also gives the legislature a 
regulatory role. However, due to lack of expertise and 
interest, the legislature does not perform this regulatory 
role in a significant way. With this legislative shortfall, 
the role of the Ministry of Defense becomes even more 
important in addressing civil-military issues in the 
country.  
C. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was established in 1994 
to bridge the gap between the civil authorities and the 
armed forces. It was designed to act as a central 
organization for the strategic management of the Malawi 
Defense Force focusing on policy and control. Among its 
roles is formulation of National Defense Policy in liaison 
with the defense force, and acting as a headquarters 
                     
111 Diamond, 1999, 70-76. 
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through which government policy decisions are translated 
into operational plans and orders. It is also responsible 
for formulating long term plans, defense programs and 
preparation of the defense budget.112 In practice, however, 
the Ministry of Defense has not been effective in its 
operations and most of its roles are performed by the 
military itself.113 An act of parliament gives the MOD power 
to assume important roles and consolidate democracy through 
institutionalized military oversight, but like the 
legislature, the MOD is exceptionally understaffed and 
lacks the necessary expertise in military issues to manage 
the armed forces effectively.114 There is only one senior 
officer from the armed forces who works full time at the 
MOD and there is no indication of oversight from the MOD in 
military programs. 
One of the most important functions of the MOD is to 
develop and produce National Security Strategy Paper/ 
Defense Policy. However, since its creation 14 years ago, 
MOD has not produced these documents. Instead, the military 
has been left on its own to develop a military strategy 
paper, which is still in progress. Strategic planning 
constitutes the linkage between policy and operations and 
forms the basis for distinguishing between roles and 
missions.115 Strategy formulation is thus the major source 
                     
112 James Kalilangwe, “The Roles of the Defense Ministry,” Msilikali 
Mangazine 1 (2003). See also the mission and objectives of the Ministry 
of Defense www.malawi.gov.mw/defense/home (accessed December 2007).  
113 Personal experience in the Malawi Defense Force. 
114 Personal experience. The author has sat in pension and 
compensation meetings with the MOD staff for over two years and has the 
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115 Richard K. Betts, “The Trouble with Strategy: Bringing Policy and 
Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 2001-2002. 
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of decisions about the roles and missions of the armed 
forces. When these decisions are made, they guide the 
direction and distribution of military resources. 
Considering that the Malawi government is extremely 
resource-constrained and military weapons are generally 
expensive, the strategy helps to ensure that minimum 
defense requirements are not compromised, and at the same 
time, the government balances military expenditures with 
other vital expenditures. Hence, these white papers are 
both a starting point and a product of good civil-military 
relations in a country like Malawi, whose national budget 
is always supplemented by donors.  
The white paper also gives direction for the military 
to quickly respond to the changing threats in the security 
environment. With the current dynamic threats and 
environments, defense establishments are challenged to 
respond to environmental changes, both in their size and 
capabilities. Any change brings its own challenges and 
disturbs the current order in the system. A strategy helps 
to maintain that order in the system while changes are 
taking place. The absence of these security strategy papers 
has affected the flexibility of adopting necessary changes 
in the defense force and has affected the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the institution. The Malawi Defense Force 
structure is army-centric with only one marine unit and air 
wing. This puts its effectiveness in joint training 
capability and operation at a disadvantage. No imaginable 
role or mission in the modern world can be achieved by only 
one service in the armed forces without the involvement of 
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the other services.116 The over-dependency on the army alone 
is not a realistic response to the changes in the 
environment and technology. This status of the defense 
force is contrary to the first objective of the MOD, which 
is “… to maintain a healthy, well trained, equipped … ready 
force and a size that is sustainable.”117 It is the duty of 
MOD to support and provide funds for properly developed 
military roles and missions, and recognize that armed 
forces are legitimate tools for democratic states.118 
Without a set of roles that are balanced with their 
requisite resources, military forces will never be capable 
of conducting successful missions, and setting out the 
roles and missions of the armed forces is the beginning of 
a cyclic process of defense decision-making.119 Malawi’s 
role in peacekeeping operations has not been well defined 
or supported by the requisite resources/weapons.120 
Another significant issue that undermines civil-
military relations is the inactiveness of MOD in the 
initiation and implementation of major programs of the 
defense force. One of the major objectives of the MOD is to 
develop and manage defense policies, strategic plans and 
                     
116 Thomas Bruneau, Steve Boraz and Christina Matei, “Towards a New 
Conceptualization of Civil-military Relations,” Unpublished Paper. 
117 Ministry of Defense, see the mission and objectives of the 
Ministry of Defense, www.malawi.gov.mw/defense/home (accessed January 
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“Epilogue: The Liberal Tradition,” in Civil-military relations and 
Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 152-153. 
119 Shemella, 140. 
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legal instruments of the armed forces, where the main focus 
is to provide an effective and efficient defense management 
system by providing proper government direction on the 
policy and strategic plans of the defense force. In other 
words, MOD is ideally involved in the administrative work 
of major programs of the military. However, there is lack 
of this coordination. The lack of guidance is particularly 
evident in the higher education program of the armed 
forces. The Malawi Defense Force, in 2007, established a 
Centre for Defense and Security Studies in conjunction with 
Mzuzu University (one of the major universities in Malawi) 
aimed at providing advanced studies in security and 
national defense, including civil-military relations to 
Malawi Defense Force and international officers, police 
officers and other security organization personnel, 
including some civilian government officers. This is part 
of an on-going initiative of the Southern African 
Development Community Countries (SADC), through Southern 
African Defense and Security Management Network (SADSEM) to 
improve security in the region. Instead of using this new 
institution as a way of establishing the relevance of the 
MOD, the Defense Ministry did not participate in its 
initiation or implementation and has virtually no role in 
the management of the center despite its significance to 
the armed forces, the nation, and in the region.121 Unlike 
in Zambia where the project enjoys the full support of the 
university administration as well as the Ministry of 
                     
121 Personal Experience, the author was involved in the curriculum 
development of this program and once attended a curriculum development 
workshop organized by Mzuzu University which had over 12 participants 
from the University, over 10 participants from the armed forces and 
only one participant from the Ministry of Defense. 
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Defense headquarters, and the latter is the key 
stakeholder.122 It remains the responsibility of the armed 
forces and Mzuzu University to train and provide funds for 
the institution. This poses significant challenges to the 
success and sustainability of the program itself since the 
MOD is responsible for negotiating for the funds with the 
Ministry of Finance and the National Assembly. In 
performing this dynamic political coordination role between 
the military and political leaders, the MOD insulates the 
military from political pressures, and vice versa, 
facilitating good civil-military relations.123 By not being 
active in this major program, the MOD has created a 
situation in which the defense force is tempted to 
negotiate directly with the president (as the commander in 
chief of the armed forces) for funds — precisely the kind 
of dynamic the MOD is designed to forestall.  
In addition, the structure of MOD leadership has often 
made it difficult for the armed forces to be accountable to 
the National Assembly, especially when the head of state 
serves as minister of defense. This has been the case for 
one of the three years of the Muthalika administration. As 
minister of defense, the president is accountable to 
parliament and is supposed to appear before the Defense and 
Security Committee of the National Assembly to present any 
significant military project, and give an account of any 
business that might be of interest to the committee; 
however, as the sitting president he cannot be called to 
appear before such a committee. As a result, the principle 
                     
122 The Southern African Defense & Security Management Network, 
http://sadsem.org/sadsempartners.htm (accessed November 2007).  
123 Bruneau and Goetze, 71-100. 
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secretary of the MOD appears in his stead. This compromises 
legislative accountability since the principle secretary is 
more limited in what he/she can do as a government employee 
than the minister responsible, who is a political figure, 
and has the ultimate command of resources and is wholly 
accountable for anything in the ministry. Thus, although 
the existence of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is an 
important basic indicator of appropriate civil-military 
relations in a country,124 in Malawi the MOD fails to meet 
the standard for effective oversight of the armed forces, 
and effective mediation of military/executive 
communications. It is not surprising therefore, to see the 
military being proactive in its own affairs, as 
demonstrated in the initiation/implementation of the 
security studies center. In the absence of effective 
performance by executive and legislative institutions, 
democratic civil-military relations may depend upon civil 
society and/or proactive military initiatives to support 
democratization of civilian oversight. 
D. CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN ACTOR IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
There is a consensus that civil society plays a 
significant role in democratization and some argue that it 
can also be vital in supporting civilian oversight of the 
military.125 In South Africa, civil society participated 
actively in developing the first democratic defense policy, 
contributing significantly to the legitimacy of democratic 
civil-military relations following the transition from 
                     
124 Bruneau and Goetze. 
125 Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, “Civil Society,” in West Africa’s Security 
Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region, edited by Adekeye 
Adebayo and Ismail Rashid. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, 269. 
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apartheid to democracy.126 However, Malawian civil society 
lacks such initiative. It has not been engaged in the 
development of the defense policy and there is no civil 
society organization focusing on military issues. In 
addition, there has been little public debate about civil-
military issues even after Operation Bwenzani, in which the 
military played a significant role in the domestic politics 
and security in the country. Like the legislature and MOD, 
the media has failed to develop expertise in military 
affairs and this has translated into a less well-informed 
public on military issues. The political culture in Malawi 
has significantly separated the military from the general 
public and this has affected the roles that civil society 
can play in the military oversight. It is, therefore, 
inconceivable for civil society to play any role in the 
military oversight in Malawi. With these dysfunctional 
institutions (executive, legislature and civil-society) the 
Malawi Defense Force has been involved in some roles which 
are typical police functions, and has performed them in 
accordance with principles of democratic civilian control. 
E. DEFENSE FORCE 
Section 160 of the Malawian constitution provides that 
the defense force of Malawi shall operate at all times 
under the direction of those civil authorities in whom the 
Constitution vests such power, and shall (a) uphold the 
                     
126 Rocky Williams, “Defense in a Democracy: The South African 
Defense Review and the Redefinition of the Parameters of the National 
Defense Debate,” Journal of Security Sector Management 2, 3 (September 
2004): 206-222. See also Lekoa Mollo, “Negotiating for Civilian 
Control: Strategy and Tactics of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in the 
Democratic Transition of South Africa,” M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, June 2000. 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic and 
guard against threats to the safety of its citizens by 
force of arms; (b) uphold and protect the Constitutional 
order in the Republic and assist the civil authorities in 
the proper exercise of their functions under this 
Constitution; (c) provide technical expertise and resources 
to assist the civilian authorities in the maintenance of 
essential services in times of emergency; and (d) perform 
such other duties outside the territory of Malawi as may be 
required of them by any treaty entered into by Malawi in 
accordance with the prescriptions of international law.127 
Section 5 of the Defense Force Act is the only section in 
the act that provides for the employment of the defense 
force and states that “the Defense Force, shall be charged 
with the defense of, and maintenance of order in, Malawi 
and with such other duties as are in accordance with the 
Constitution and the Act.”128 These roles are too broad to 
establish a clear line between police and military 
functions to avoid the political use of the military. The 
inability to make a clear distinction between the army and 
police, and define the conditions under which those forces 
should work together, has often led governments to military 
and political failure.129 
Malawi faces significant internal insecurity due to 
political party instability, which increases the negative 
effects of overly broad security force roles and civil-
                     
127 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, Chapter XVI, 70- 71. 
128 Defense Force Act, Government Printer, No. 11 of 2004. 
129 Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed 
Forces,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How, edited by Thomas Bruneau 
and Scott Tollefson, Austin, TX: Texas University Press, 2006, 124. 
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military relations, as civil authorities are increasingly 
tempted to bring the military in to settle domestic 
political disputes.130 The recent deployment of troops to 
stop an opposition party rally has provoked many questions 
about the military role in the country.131 
In addition to these overt uses of the police and the 
army by the president for political gain, the armed forces 
are regularly involved in many politically sensitive police 
functions, such as guarding election materials (ballot 
papers and boxes) during general elections, and 
transferring ballot boxes to and from voting centers. This 
role, although aimed at securing the election process, may 
compromise the military’s reputation and legitimacy when 
the election process or results are challenged and there is 
evidence of rigging. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the institutional obstacles 
to good civil-military relations in Malawi. The weaknesses 
of different institutions vis-à-vis legislature, MOD, and 
civil society have made the president the sole controller 
                     
130 Asia Africa News Paper, “Malawi president dissolves national spy 
agency,” Asia Africa Intelligence Wire Publication, January 5, 2005, 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com (accessed December 2007). See also 
“Shyley to head new Intelligence body in Malawi,” http://allafrica.com 
(accessed January 2008). See also Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily 
Newswire. See also Nation Newspaper, March 26, 2007. The News editorial 
centered on the March 25, 2007 abortive political rally in Mulanje by 
the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) following intervention by 
the Malawi Defense Force (MDF). 
131 Nation Newspaper, March 26, 2007. The News editorial centered on 
the March 25, 2007 abortive political rally in Mulanje by the 
opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) following intervention by the 
Malawi Defense Force (MDF) personnel who had mounted road blocks in 
several strategic places. It was that intervention that prompted others 
like the Malawi Commission for Human Rights (MHRC) to unreservedly 
condemn the action by the army.  
 60
of the military and its missions. Different recommendations 
on the direction toward good civil-military relations will 
be outlined in the concluding chapter.  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
After the assessment of civil-military relations in 
Malawi, this thesis suggests different measures that can be 
taken to move toward the recommended civil-military 
relations. The history of civil-military relations 
indicates executive dominance in the control of the armed 
forces, with little or no legislative oversight. Although 
the formal institutions necessary for good civil-military 
relations are in place, such as the legislative committee 
on defense and security, these have been, to a great 
extent, non-functional. The national assembly should, 
therefore, take the necessary steps to empower itself and 
play a significant role in military oversight by making a 
thorough scrutiny of the defense budget and make sure it is 
viable for the national security of the country. It must 
also follow through on the budget passed. This thesis 
indicates that there is little expertise in the national 
assembly, as a whole, and the committee on defense and 
security in particular, in defense and security issues and 
civil-military relations. It also shows that the 
constitutional provision limits the tenure of office for 
the committee members and, therefore, limits the 
development of expertise in the committee itself in civil-
military relations. It is recommended that the expertise in 
defense and security should be developed in the committee 
by amending the constitution and by increasing the tenure 
of office. The parliamentary staff on defense and security 
must gain in-depth knowledge of civil-military relations 
and national security by exposing themselves to different 
models of civil-military relations in developed countries 
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like the United States of America. A system of functional 
committees with professional staffs, who have sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the military’s institutional 
requirements, is necessary to enable them to contribute to 
healthy civil -military relations and oversight. It is only 
through this that they will work as well-informed advisors 
to the committee.  
The fact that the legislative body is not involved in 
the confirmation of the defense chief/defense force 
commander has, for a long time, made the National Assembly 
miss the opportunity for an effective oversight of the 
armed forces. The current political situation in the 
country, however, does not favor this proposal of 
legislative oversight due to political tension between the 
president and the legislature. The country has witnessed 
how politics have delayed the confirmation of senior public 
servants appointed by the president, some of which have 
been turned down by the National Assembly, mainly due to 
political reasons.132 Parliament has used this confirmation 
process as a way of showing its political muscle against 
the president, rather than performing its duties with 
impartiality. Parliamentary sitting has since been 
prorogued, since September 2007, due to the same political 
tension between opposition and government members of 
                     
132 Malawi Press Review, “Annual Review of the Major Newspapers in 
Malawi,” Centre For Social Concern, December 2005. In parliament, all 
was uncertain and the opposition MPs flexed their muscles to show who 
was boss in a democracy, and the first female head of police, Ms. 
Nangwale, became the victim. This has also been the case with the 




parliament and is unlikely to open soon.133 Trusting such 
MPs with the confirmation of the defense chief and the 
appointment of senior staff in the armed forces may not be 
a good idea for the national security of the country, and 
may compromise the nation’s security and the institutional 
prestige and integrity of the military.134 The National 
Assembly must, therefore, organize itself in a manner that 
will accord itself public respect and confidence. The 
executive, on the other hand, must address the political 
issues surrounding Section 65 of the constitution (crossing 
the floor by members of parliament from the opposition side 
to the government side) to settle the legislative/executive 
conflicts, and when that is done, it will be easy to trust 
it with officers’ promotions and the confirmation of high 
ranking military officers. 
Malawi needs to move toward greater democratic 
consolidation by allowing greater executive accountability 
to the law, to other branches of the government and to the 
public, and create more space, energy, autonomy and 
mechanisms for independent action by the civil society to 
be heard. Civil society must, therefore, be incorporated in 
civil-military relations issues in the country in order to 
fill the gap in legislative shortfalls and act as a source 
                     
133 Daily Times Newspaper, January 29, 2008, “House Won’t Meet Says 
Minister,” Government says parliament will never meet until the 
opposition stops behaving irresponsibly and childishly, a statement an 
analyst has condemned as unfortunate. Minister of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Elderly Clement Khembo said parliament has lost 
respect, due to what he termed childish and irresponsible, with 
opposition MPs and their leaders who use abusive language while 
transacting business in the House. He did not mention names, but UDF 
leader in the House, George Mtafu, is on record as having called fellow 
MPs in the House agalu (dogs). 
134 Diamond, 1999: 70-76. 
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of pressure on the executive to change when the legislature 
fails to do so. Through this institutionalization, trust 
and cooperation among political actors will increase and 
build a political culture of democracy and enhanced 
legitimacy of the democratic system and civil-military 
relations.135 Malawi needs to amend the constitutional 
provisions that give much more power to the executive than 
the other institutions, and in the process, does not 
enhance viable civil-military relations and promote 
legislative oversight. A clear legal framework must 
establish who is in control in the oversight of the 
military and the intelligence system and how the power is 
balanced between the executive and the legislature.136  
The ministry of defense is another important 
institution in the civil-military relations set-up that 
needs serious consideration in the country. This thesis 
indicates that the MOD in Malawi is highly dysfunctional 
when it comes to a mediator role between the elected civil 
authorities and the military. The MOD needs to muster the 
skills and expertise to effectively perform the oversight 
functions and become relevant in civil-military discourses 
in the country. It must develop negotiating skills to 
enable it to seek funds, from both the legislature and the 
ministry of finance, for the military to function properly 
and insulate the military from political manipulation. It 
must be the driving force for the major military projects 
such as the Defense and Security Studies Centre at Mzuzu 
University. The MOD must make the necessary efforts to 
                     
135 Diamond, 75. 
136 Bruneau and Dombroski, 155-171. 
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develop the National Security Strategy Papers/Defense 
Policy to guide the military roles and missions. Malawi 
Defense Force participation in peacekeeping operations is 
not clearly documented and its mission and participation 
has not been exclusive, due to lack of resources and 
equipment. By making it a clear mission of the force, the 
civil authorities will be mandated to provide all the 
necessary resources and improve the participation of such 
moral missions.  
The objectives that the MOD has put in place must be 
implemented, not just on paper. With the current dynamic 
threats and environments, the MOD must assist the military 
in responding to such environmental changes by proving all 
the necessary capabilities so that the military stays up-
to-date and able to respond to the existing threats. There 
is no doubt that civilian defense policy experts are needed 
to interpret military needs for the elected officials and 
to serve as interlocutors between the armed forces and 
society, and as a mature and autonomous point of 
deliberation in the military policy process.137 Military 
restraint alone, in Malawi, is not sufficient for 
satisfactory civil-military relations; the importance and 
complexity of the military’s core missions and the rapid 
pace of worldwide changes require close collaboration 
between military officers and civilians knowledgeable about 
each other’s institutional needs. Designing new roles for 
the armed forces is part of the contemporary effort at re-
                     
137 Louis W. Goodman, “Military Roles Past and Present,” in Civil-
Military Relations and Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc 
Plattner, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996: 
41. 
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establishing democratic control over the armed forces.138 
The need to craftily design the implementation of civil-
military relations concepts, depending on the political 
culture and state capacity, in order not to threaten the 
national security of the country and the democratic 
process, is of paramount importance. Hence, future 
developments in civil-military relations in the country 
will largely depend on the actions of the civilian 
leadership and the institutionalization of civil-military 
relations.139 
                     
138 Agbese, 205. 
139 Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006. See also Larry Diamond and Marc 
Plattner, 1996, xiii. 
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